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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
Citizens Publishing and Printing Company and the two 
brothers who operate it, W. Ryan Kegel ("RKegel") and Scott 
R. Kegel ("SKegel"), filed a Petition for Review of a final 
decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board 
("Board"). The Board has filed a Cross-Application for 
Enforcement. We have been asked to review (1) whether 
Petitioners (collectively, "Citizens Publishing") committed an 
unfair labor practice by unilaterally subcontracting night 
and weekend photography work to independent 
contractors, and (2) whether the labor strike was an"unfair 
labor practice strike," rather than a mere economic strike. 
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board's 
affirmative findings as to both inquiries, as well as its 
additional finding that Citizens Publishing falsely informed 
the union that the striking employees had been 
permanently replaced, thereby failing to reinstate the 
strikers immediately upon their unconditional offer to 
return to work. Therefore, we will deny the petition and 
grant the cross-application. Further, because neither party 
challenges the propriety or scope of the relief ordered by the 






The facts germane to the issues on appeal are as follows. 
Citizens Publishing and Printing Company is a family- 
owned corporation, which publishes, circulates, and 
distributes the Ellwood City Ledger, a daily newspaper, and 
the Valley Tribune, a weekly newspaper. RKegel is the vice- 
president and publisher with overall responsibility for the 
company. SKegel is the general manager, who, together 
with RKegel, is responsible for all day-to-day operations. 
Each brother owns one-third of the company's stock. 
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Before 1993, Citizens Publishing had employed Bud 
Dimeo as its sole full-time photographer for over 35 years. 
Dimeo performed regular daytime photography work. To 
cover the night/weekend work, Citizens Publishing had 
used several stringers over the years, sometimes hiring 
three to four at a time. Stringers are independent 
contractors who contribute stories and/or who take 
photographs for the newspaper on an ad hoc basis. They 
are paid by-the-line for articles or a flat fee for each photo. 
 
At some point in 1993, daytime photography work began 
to decline for Dimeo such that sufficient work to sustain a 
full-time photographer position no longer existed. As a 
result, in August 1993, Citizens Publishing assigned 
night/weekend work to Dimeo as part of his regular duties. 
From August 1993 until his retirement in January 1995, 
Dimeo was responsible for the majority of the newspaper's 
night/weekend work. Because the night/weekend work was 
part of his full-time duties, Dimeo did not receive any 
additional compensation for these photographs. During this 
same time, the full-time sports editor, Mark Crepp, also 
expressed an interest in earning extra money. Citizens 
Publishing thus assigned night/weekend work to him as 
well, paying him a per picture rate. Additionally, Citizens 
Publishing continued to hire stringers to perform 
night/weekend work. 
 
On December 28, 1993, Teamsters Local Union No. 261 
("Union") was certified as the exclusive collective bargaining 
representative for certain employees of the company. This 
certified bargaining unit did not include stringers. In early 
1994, the Union and Citizens Publishing began negotiating 
for an initial collective-bargaining agreement. During the 
negotiations, the parties discussed Citizens Publishing's 
use of stringers but did not resolve the matter. On June 3, 
1994, the parties agreed that, while the negotiations 
progressed, Citizens Publishing would continue its past 
practice. The next day, the Union requested that Citizens 
Publishing hire a stringer to do night/weekend work in 
order to enable Dimeo to spend more time with his ailing 
wife. Citizens Publishing refused, insisting that it was not 
going to give Dimeo full-time pay to work part-time. 
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When Dimeo retired in January 1995, Citizens Publishing 
assigned Crepp to be the temporary full-time photographer. 
In addition to his new photography duties, Crepp also 
alternated as a weekend sports editor, writing sports stories 
and assisting with the layout of the sports section. He also 
worked on an annual business supplement published by 
Citizens Publishing. In March 1995, Crepp informed 
company management that he was having difficulty 
completing the night/weekend work that Dimeo had 
previously performed. In response, Citizens Publishing 
hired several stringers to cover the night/weekend work. 
Citizens Publishing informed Crepp that the stringers 
would perform most of the photography work, but that 
Crepp would continue to take sports photographs on nights 
and weekends. Citizens Publishing neither notified the 
Union of its decision to subcontract the night/weekend 
photography work previously assigned to Dimeo nor gave 
the Union the opportunity to bargain over this decision. 
 
At the parties' next negotiating session, on April 11, 
1995, the Union asserted that Citizens Publishing had 
unilaterally removed photography work from the bargaining 
unit by subcontracting the night/weekend work. The Union 
asked Citizens Publishing to rescind its action, but the 
company refused. On April 18, the Union filed an unfair 
labor practice charge with the Board, alleging that Citizens 
Publishing, in subcontracting night/weekend work, had 
unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of 
employment without bargaining, as required under federal 
labor law. 
 
On July 21, 1995, the Union learned that the Board 
intended to issue a complaint based upon the Union's 
unfair labor practice charge. Two days later, the Union met 
with the employees and informed them of Citizens 
Publishing's unilateral change and its refusal to rescind its 
action, as well as the impending Board complaint. After 
learning of Citizens Publishing's unfair labor practice, 
numerous employees indicated their desire to go on strike, 
and the membership held a strike vote. The membership 
voted to strike and left work the next day, July 24. 
 
After the bargaining unit employees went on strike, 
Citizens Publishing continued to publish its newspapers, 
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relying on the assistance of family members, supervisory 
employees, and a few non-striking bargaining unit 
employees. Eventually, Citizens Publishing hired temporary 
replacement workers. On January 5, 1996, the Union 
contacted Citizens Publishing, seeking to resume 
bargaining and requesting information concerning the 
replacements. On February 22, the Union requested 
additional information, advising Citizens Publishing that 
the information was necessary "in the event that our 
members make an unconditional offer to return to work." 
By letter dated March 5, Citizens Publishing responded, 
asserting that "[n]one of the temporary replacements are 
considered to be permanent replacements." 
 
The parties then scheduled a bargaining session for 
March 14, 1996. Two days earlier, RKegel and SKegel had 
met with Donald Smith, a management consultant 
representing Citizens Publishing in its negotiations with the 
Union. At that meeting, the Kegels had informed Smith that 
they were happy with the replacement employees' job 
performance and that, if he could not reach an agreement 
with the Union soon, they would favor the permanent 
replacement of the strikers. The next day, on March 13, the 
Kegels and Smith drafted a letter from RKegel to Smith, 
stating that Citizens Publishing believed the strike was an 
economic strike, and that the company considered the 
temporary replacements "to be regular permanent 
replacement employees," namely, that the strikers were 
being permanently replaced. 
 
When the parties met on March 14, Smith began the 
session by stating that he understood that the Union 
planned to make an unconditional offer to return to work 
that day. The Union representative responded affirmatively 
but indicated that he also needed some additional 
information. The parties discussed several issues, including 
the wages that the strikers would receive upon their return. 
When the Union sought a list identifying the replacement 
workers and the jobs that they performed, Citizens 
Publishing requested a caucus to consider the Union's 
request. 
 
During the caucus, Smith and SKegel met with RKegel at 
a nearby restaurant. When Smith and SKegel reported that 
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the negotiations were not progressing, RKegel instructed 
them to give the Union the March 13 letter indicating that 
the replacements were considered permanent. When Smith 
and SKegel returned to the bargaining session, they gave 
the Union the March 13 letter. The bargaining session 
ended shortly thereafter. At that time, Citizens Publishing 
had not yet contacted the replacement employees regarding 
any change in their employment status. Citizens Publishing 
only advised its replacements on the next day, March 15, 
that they were now viewed by company management as 
permanent replacements. 
 
Although the Union requested additional bargaining 
dates, Citizens Publishing did not meet with the Union 
again until May 13, 1996. That meeting resulted in a brief, 
non-productive session. On May 15, the Union's president 
sent Smith a letter, stating that he wished to "reconfirm" 
that "each of the employees represented by Local 261 is 
making an unconditional offer to return to work, at all 
times since March 14, 1996." Citizens Publishing never 
allowed the striking employees to return to their jobs, and 




Several labor cases arose from the foregoing factual 
background. They were ultimately consolidated and tried in 
October 1996 before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), 
who issued his decision on June 30, 1997. The ALJ 
concluded, among other things, that Citizens Publishing 
had violated SS 8(a)(5), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(1) of the National 
Labor Relations Act ("Act") by: (1) unilaterally 
subcontracting the night/weekend work of the full-time 
photographers to stringers; (2) falsely informing the strikers 
that they had been permanently replaced; and (3) failing to 
reinstate the strikers immediately upon their unconditional 
offer to return to work. 
 
After Citizens Publishing filed exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision, a three-member panel of the Board (with one 
member dissenting) issued its decision and order on August 
31, 2000, affirming the ALJ's rulings, findings, and 
conclusions, as modified, and adopting a modified order. 
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The Board ordered Citizens Publishing to cease and desist 
from: (1) unilaterally subcontracting night/weekend work 
performed by the regular, full-time photographer; (2) 
unlawfully discharging strikers and failing to reinstate 
them; and (3) interfering with, restraining, or coercing 
employees in the exercise of their statutory rights. The 
Board also affirmatively ordered Citizens Publishing, among 
other things, to: (1) restore the status quo with respect to 
the night/weekend work performed by the regular, full-time 
photographer before April 15, 1995; (2) offer full 
reinstatement to the unfair labor practice strikers; (3) make 
the unfair labor practice strikers whole for any loss of 
earnings or other benefits suffered; and (4) post a remedial 
notice. 
 
Citizens Publishing thereafter filed a Petition for Review 
in this Court on September 27, 2000, seeking to set aside 
the Board's decision. The Board also filed a Cross- 
Application for Enforcement on November 9, 2000. The 
Clerk's Office assigned the cases separate docket numbers, 
but, because they raised identical issues, we consolidated 




The Board exercised jurisdiction over this proceeding 
under 29 U.S.C. SS 160(a), (b). The Board's decision and 
order was a final order with respect to all the parties. See 
id. S 160(c). As the alleged unfair labor practice occurred 
within this Circuit, we may exercise jurisdiction over the 
petition and the cross-application for enforcement under 29 
U.S.C. SS 160(e) and (f). Both the petition and cross- 
application were timely filed as the Act places no time limit 
on such filings. See Schaefer v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 558, 560- 
61 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
On review, we "accept the Board's factual determinations 
and reasonable inferences derived from factual 
determinations if they are supported by substantial 
evidence." CPS Chem. Co. v. NLRB, 160 F.3d 150, 154 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted); accord 
29 U.S.C. SS 160(e), (f); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951). Substantial evidence is"more 
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than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, to support 
the Board's conclusion, the evidence "must do more than 
create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be 
established. . . . [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial 
were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the 
conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the 
jury." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
However, we will not disturb the Board's factual inferences, 
even if we would have made a contrary determination had 
the matter been before us de novo. Id.  at 488; Hedstrom Co. 
v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305, 313-14, 316 (3d Cir. 1980) (en 
banc). 
 
Further, our review is plenary over the Board's legal 
analysis but, "[b]ecause of the Board's `special competence' 
in the field of labor relations, its interpretation of the Act is 
accorded substantial deference." Pattern Makers' League of 
N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 100 (1985). That is, we will 
uphold the Board's interpretations of the Act if they are 
reasonable. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 
(1979); Resorts Int'l Hotel Casino v. NLRB, 996 F.2d 1553, 




We first address whether Citizens Publishing committed 
an unfair labor practice by unilaterally subcontracting 
night/weekend work to stringers. 
 
Under S 8(a)(5) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for 
an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C.S 158(a)(5). 
Further, S 8(a)(5), as augmented by S 8(d), requires an 
employer to bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment." Id. S 158(d). Accordingly, an 
employer violates S 8(a)(5) "if, without bargaining to 
impasse, it effects a unilateral change of an existing term or 
condition of employment." Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 
501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991); accord Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 
629 F.2d 305, 317 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc). By unilaterally 
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changing the employees' terms and conditions of 
employment, an employer "minimizes the influence of 
organized bargaining" and "emphasiz[es] to the employees 
that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent." 
May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 385 (1945). By 
doing so, the employer also derivatively violatesS 8(a)(1) of 
the Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice"to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise 
of " their statutory federal labor rights. 29 U.S.C. 
S 158(a)(1). 
 
When parties are engaged in negotiations for an initial 
collective-bargaining agreement, the prohibition against 
unilateral changes continues "unless and until an overall 
impasse has been reached on bargaining for the agreement 
as a whole." Master Window Cleaning, Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 
373, 374 (1991), enforced, 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994); 
accord NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-48 (1962) (holding 
that an employer violates the Act by undertaking unilateral 
action while the parties are engaged in bargaining for an 
initial collective-bargaining agreement). The allocation of 
bargaining unit work is a term or condition of employment. 
See Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. NLRB, 676 
F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Accordingly, an employer 
violates SS 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) by unilaterally diverting or 
subcontracting work allocated to the bargaining unit at the 
time of the union's certification. See, e.g., Acme Die Casting, 
315 N.L.R.B. 202, 202 n.1 (1994) (holding that the 
employer violated the Act by subcontracting unit work 
while the parties were negotiating for an initial collective- 
bargaining agreement); cf. Adair Standish Corp. v. NLRB, 
912 F.2d 854, 863-64 (6th Cir.) (holding that the employer 
violated the Act by instituting changes in the employees' 
schedules following the union's certification), enforced, 914 
F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1990). By contrast, where an employer's 
action does not involve a unilateral change in the status 
quo, but rather, a continuation of an uninterrupted, 
established past practice, its action does not violate the Act. 
See, e.g., Bryant & Stratton Bus. Inst. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 
169, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the employer did 
not violate the Act where its required use of a sign-in board 
was a "reaffirmation of its previous policy and not a change 
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in the employee's terms and conditions of employment of 
unit employees"). 
 
Here, substantial evidence supports the Board's finding 
that, as of August 1993, Citizens Publishing's 
night/weekend work became "an integral part of the regular 
full-time photographer's work," and thus, became 
bargaining unit work. The record plainly reveals that, by 
1993, the workload of the full-time photographer had 
declined to the point that there was not enough work to 
sustain the full-time position. Thus, in August 1993, when 
Citizens Publishing assigned the night/weekend work to 
Dimeo, that work became a necessary and integral part of 
the full-time photographer's position. Indeed, Citizens 
Publishing's refusal to have night/weekend work removed 
from Dimeo's duties, and its concomitant insistence to the 
Union that it would not give Dimeo full-time pay for part- 
time work, exemplify this change. Additionally, Dimeo did 
not receive any additional remuneration for his 
night/weekend work. These facts support the Board's 
finding that Citizens Publishing "made [night/weekend] 
work part of the regular duties of the full-time 
photographer." Thus, at the time of the Union's certification 
in December 1993, the status quo included a full-time 
photographer's position with night/weekend work. 
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the 
determination that Citizens Publishing violated the Act 
when it unilaterally subcontracted the bargaining unit work 
during the negotiations over the initial collective-bargaining 
agreement. 
 
Citizens Publishing contends that substantial evidence 
does not support the Board's decision that it had 
committed an unfair labor practice because it was merely 
adhering to a well established past practice when it utilized 
stringers after August 1993. This contention, however, fails 
to recognize that status quo is determined as of the time of 
a union's certification. See, e.g., NLRB v. Talsol Corp., 155 
F.3d 785, 794 (6th Cir. 1998); Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 
618 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (5th Cir. 1980). Thus, although 
Citizens Publishing had used stringers to perform a small 
part of the night/weekend work, that work had become an 
integral part of the full-time photographer's job at the time 
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of the Union's certification in December 1993. In other 
words, it had become bargaining unit work. For this 
reason, the Board reasonably focused on the duties of the 
full-time photographer, rather than the stringers, thereby 
finding that, by removing work from that bargaining unit 
position, Citizens Publishing had unilaterally changed the 
terms and conditions of the full-time photographer's 
employment. Accordingly, contrary to its contention, 
Citizens Publishing's action was inconsistent with a past 
practice and violated SS 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act. 
 
Therefore, substantial evidence supports the Board's 
decision that Citizens Publishing committed an unfair labor 
practice when it unilaterally subcontracted night/weekend 




We next address whether the strike was an "unfair labor 
practice strike," as opposed to a mere economic strike. 
 
The right of employees to engage in a lawful strike is a 
fundamental provision of the Act. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor 
Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-35 (1963); NLRB v. Int'l Rice 
Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672-72 & nn. 6-8 (1951); see also 
29 U.S.C. S 163 ("Nothing in [the Act], except as specifically 
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to 
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to 
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that 
right."). All striking workers retain their status as 
"employees" under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. S 152(3). Striking 
workers fall within two categories: (1) unfair labor practice 
strikers, who are motivated, at least in part, by their 
employer's commission of an unfair labor practice; and (2) 
economic strikers, who are striking over recognition or 
bargaining demands. General Indus. Employees Union, 
Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 
One difference between these two categories is that the 
former enjoys greater reinstatement rights. Specifically, 
unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to immediate 
reinstatement upon their unconditional offers to return to 
work; any replacements hired during the strike must be 
dismissed, if necessary, to effect reinstatement of the 
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strikers. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 
(1956); Hajoca Corp. v. NLRB, 872 F.2d 1169, 1177 (3d Cir. 
1989). By contrast, economic strikers are entitled, upon 
their unconditional offers to return to work, to 
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent 
positions, if no permanent replacements have been hired to 
replace them and the positions remain open. NLRB v. 
Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1967). 
 
An unfair labor practice strike is any strike that is 
caused "at least in part" by an employer's unfair labor 
practice. Struthers Wells Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 465, 471 
(3d Cir. 1983). It is immaterial whether other reasons for a 
strike exist because, "if an unfair labor practice had 
anything to do with causing the strike," that strike is an 
unfair labor practice strike. NLRB v. Cast Optics Corp., 458 
F.2d 398, 407 (3d Cir. 1972) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). Further, a strike that begins as an 
economic dispute can be converted into an unfair labor 
practice strike if an employer's subsequent unfair labor 
practice aggravates or prolongs the strike. NLRB v. Frick 
Co., 397 F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1968). A failure to reinstate 
unfair labor practice strikers constitutes prohibited 
discrimination under SS 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act 
because it has the effect of discouraging employees from 
exercising their rights to organize and to strike under the 
Act. Mastro, 350 U.S. at 278; Struthers , 721 F.2d at 471. 
Whether a strike is an unfair labor practice strike is a 
factual issue upon which the Board's findings are 
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on the 
record as a whole. Columbia Portland Cement Co. v. NLRB, 
915 F.2d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 
Here, substantial evidence supports the Board's finding 
that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike. The 
Union convened a meeting of bargaining unit members on 
the day before the strike began. At that meeting, the Union 
discussed Citizens Publishing's allegedly unlawful removal 
of night/weekend work from the full-time photographer's 
duties and notified the employees that the Board's regional 
office would be issuing a complaint against Citizens 
Publishing based upon that unfair labor practice. After 
learning of Citizens Publishing's action, numerous 
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employees indicated their desire to go on strike, and the 
membership held a strike vote. These facts support the 
Board's finding that its decision to issue a complaint 
"galvanized the bargaining unit members' belief that an 
unfair labor practice had been committed and served as the 
flashpoint for discussion about calling a strike." 
 
Moreover, even if Citizens Publishing's subcontracting of 
night/weekend work did not constitute an unfair labor 
practice, its discharge of the striking employees on March 
14, 1996 converted the strike into an unfair labor practice 
strike because it prolonged the strike. As the Board found, 
and as we explain below, Citizens Publishing's false 
declaration that it had permanently replaced the strikers 
prolonged the strike by thwarting the Union's attempt to 
make an unconditional offer to return to work that day. 
Indeed, the Union informed Citizens Publishing at the 
March 14 bargaining session of its intent to make an 
unconditional offer to return to work. Before the Union 
could make its offer, however, Citizens Publishing pre- 
emptively notified the Union that it had permanently 
replaced the strikers, thereby effectively informing the 
Union that any unconditional offer to return to work would 
be futile. Accordingly, the Board reasonably found that, 
even if the strike had begun as an economic strike, Citizens 
Publishing's false declaration had prolonged the strike and 
converted it into an unfair labor practice strike. Cf. NLRB v. 
Champ Corp., 933 F.2d 688, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that the employer's conduct effectively derailed 
contract negotiations, thereby prolonging the economic 
strike and converting it into an unfair labor practice strike). 
 
To support its argument that the strike was a mere 
economic strike, Citizens Publishing contends that its 
unlawful subcontracting could not have had a causal 
connection to the decision to strike because the strike vote 
in July 1995 took place four months after its own action in 
March 1995. Citizens Publishing's argument, however, 
sidesteps the fact that a lapse in time between an unfair 
labor practice and a strike is "not conclusive in establishing 
the basis for a strike." Burns Motor Freight, Inc., 250 
N.L.R.B. 276, 277-78 (1980). Further, it overlooks the fact 
that the Union did not convene its membership until the 
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Board's regional office had determined that Citizens 
Publishing's unlawful subcontracting was, in actuality, an 
unfair labor practice. 
 
Citizens Publishing also maintains that the Union 
provided bargaining committee members with inaccurate 
and misleading information to foment the strike (namely, 
that Crepp would no longer be a photographer and that the 
company had subcontracted out all of the photography 
work), and thus, the strike was an economic strike, rather 
than an unfair labor strike. This misrepresentation, 
however, was insignificant because the Union only made it 
to the five employee members of the bargaining committee, 
not to the bargaining unit members as whole, and thus, its 
effect on the Union's membership was minimal. In any 
case, the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to 
support the Board's contrary finding that, in deciding to 
strike, the employees were motivated by Citizens 
Publishing's unfair labor practice, not by the Union's 
misrepresentation. 
 
Similarly, Citizens Publishing argues that only the 
Union's motivation, and not the striking employees' 
motivation, is relevant to the Board's determination of 
causation. We do not agree. The Board has repeatedly 
relied upon evidence of the strikers' motivation to show that 
the strike is based, at least in part, upon the employer's 
unfair labor practice. Citizens Publishing has cited no 
authority in which the Board or courts have applied a 
different rule. See, e.g., Alwin Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.3d 
133, 141-42 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the striking 
employees' motivation for striking is central to a finding of 
an unfair labor practice strike); Calex Corp. v. NLRB, 144 
F.3d 904, 911 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the employees' 
discussion at pre-strike meeting are significant in finding 
an unfair labor practice strike). 
 
Therefore, substantial evidence supports the Board's 
decision that the ensuing labor strike was an "unfair labor 




Although we have determined that the striking employees 
had participated in an unfair labor practice strike, rather 
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than an economic strike, we also find substantial evidence 
in the record to uphold the Board's decision to reinstate the 
striking employees based upon an alternative ground. Even 
assuming that the strike was an economic strike, we would 
uphold the Board's decision because of Citizens 
Publishing's false representation to the Union that the 
strikers had been permanently replaced and its subsequent 
failure to reinstate them immediately upon their 
unconditional offer to return to work. 
 
Under S 8(a)(3) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for 
an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure 
of employment or any term or condition of employment to 
encourage or discourage" union membership. 29 U.S.C. 
S 158(a)(3). Thus, an employer violates S 8(a)(3) (and, 
derivatively, S 8(a)(1)) by discharging employees because of 
their union activity. NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 
393, 397-98, 401 (1983), overruled on other grounds, 
Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 
(1994). One example of a protected union activity is 
"participation in concerted activities, such as a legitimate 
strike." NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233 
(1963) (citation omitted); see also Div. 1287 of the 
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry and Motor Coach 
Employees of Am. v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 82 (1963) 
("Collective bargaining, with the right to strike at its core, is 
the essence of the federal scheme."); 29 U.S.C.SS 157, 163. 
 
As we explained above, the right to strike does not 
prevent an employer from hiring permanent replacements 
during a strike. However, "[t]he discharge of. . . strikers 
prior . . . to the time their places are filled" violates 
SS 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1). NLRB v. Int'l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 
52 (1972) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In 
order for replacement workers to be considered permanent, 
the employer and the replacements must have a "mutual 
understanding" regarding their permanent status. See, e.g., 
NLRB v. Augusta Bakery Corp., 957 F.2d 1467, 1473 (7th 
Cir. 1992). Accordingly, an employer's false declaration that 
strikers have been permanently replaced effectively 
discharges the employees because the effect of that action 
is to withhold from strikers "the right to return to their 
unoccupied jobs simply because they have gone out on 
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strike." Am. Linen Supply Co., 297 N.L.R.B. 137, 137 
(1989), enforced, 945 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1991); see, e.g., 
Int'l Van, 409 U.S. at 50, 53 (holding that a statement that 
striking employees "are being permanently replaced" 
constituted an unlawful discharge when permanent 
replacements had not been hired); W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 237 
N.L.R.B. 177, 178-79 (1978) (holding that falsely informing 
strikers that they had been permanently replaced 
constituted an unlawful discharge), enforced, 617 F.2d 349 
(3d Cir. 1980). Although the case law supporting the 
foregoing proposition involves false declarations made to 
economic strikers, the underlying principle is equally 
applicable to unfair labor practice strikers who have more, 
not fewer, rights and protections under the Act. See Pirelli 
Cable Corp. v. NLRB, 141 F.3d 503, 519 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(stating that "[u]nfair labor practice strikers have more 
rights and protections" than economic strikers); George 
Banta Co. v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 10, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting 
that statutory reinstatement rights of economic and unfair 
labor practice strikers are "identical" except that the 
employer may not hire permanent replacements during an 
unfair labor practice strike). 
 
Here, substantial evidence supports the Board's finding 
that, by falsely informing the striking employees that they 
had been permanently replaced, Citizens Publishing 
violated SS 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act. Citizens Publishing 
concedes in its brief that, on March 14, 1996, it gave the 
Union a letter indicating that, on March 13, it considered 
the replacement workers to be permanent hires. Citizens 
Publishing further concedes in its brief that it did not 
advise the replacements that they had become permanent 
employees until one day after giving the March 13 letter to 
the Union. Thus, Citizens Publishing and the replacement 
workers plainly lacked a mutual understanding regarding 
the replacement workers' status at the time Citizens 
Publishing presented the letter to the Union. These facts 
support the Board's finding that Citizens Publishing falsely 
advised the Union that it had permanently replaced the 
strikers. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the 
determination that Citizens Publishing violated the Act by 
effectively discharging the striking employees through a 
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false declaration and withholding from them the right to 
return to their unoccupied jobs. 
 
Moreover, by informing the Union in the March 13 letter 
that it considered the strikers to be economic strikers who 
were being permanently replaced, Citizens Publishing pre- 
empted the strikers' ability to make an unconditional offer 
to return to work. Thus, even if the strike was an economic 
strike, substantial evidence supports the determination 
that Citizens Publishing's representation violated the Act by 
enabling it to pre-empt the Union's unconditional offer to 
return to work, thereby affording Citizens Publishing the 
opportunity to hire actual permanent replacements. 
 
Consequently, Citizens Publishing's reliance in its brief 
on the seemingly small amount of time (one day) it took to 
notify the replacements of their status after notifying the 
strikers is misplaced because the key fact under federal 
labor law is the effect of the misrepresentation. In addition, 
Citizens Publishing's contention that the misrepresentation 
did not violate the Act because it was made to the 
employees' union representatives, rather than directly to 
the strikers, is factually inaccurate because, as Citizens 
Publishing concedes in its brief, it delivered the message 
directly to two striking employees who were part of the 
Union's bargaining team. 
 
Finally, Citizens Publishing contends that substantial 
evidence does not support the Board's decision here 
because it truthfully and accurately reflected its view of the 
replacement workers' status in the March 13 letter. 
However, this assertion ignores the fact that the letter 
stated that the changed status occurred "[e]ffective today," 
or March 13, even though the replacements were not 
actually informed until March 15. As a result, the Board 
reasonably interpreted the letter as falsely informing the 
Union that the strikers were permanently replaced as of 
March 13. But cf. Noel Foods, a Div. of Noel Corp. v. NLRB, 
82 F.3d 1113, 1119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that 
the employer's statement to the striking employees that it 
had hired permanent replacements was truthful when 
made). Further, the Board reasonably inferred that Citizens 
Publishing's intent in writing and delivering the letter on 
March 14 was reflected in the letter's message, namely, 
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that, because the strikers were being permanently replaced, 
it would be futile for the Union to make an unconditional 
offer to return to work. 
 
Therefore, substantial evidence supports the Board's 
decision that Citizens Publishing falsely advised the Union 
that the strikers had been permanently replaced and failed 
to reinstate the strikers immediately upon their 




For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition and 
grant the cross-application. Accordingly, because neither 
party challenges the propriety or scope of the relief ordered 
by the Board, we will enforce the Board's order in its 
entirety. 
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